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How do Norwegian government officials perceive the dilemma between liberty and security 
after the 2011 terrorist attacks? A survey from 2016 shows that the central government officials’ 
attitudes are rather similar to the general population. Both are willing to trade individual rights 
for more societal security. Structural, cultural and demographic features explain variations in 
the civil servants’ views. Position and perceptions of crisis management capacity make a 
difference. Officials responsible for crisis management are more willing to prioritize security. 
Low conflict, high trust and a strong identification with central government creates support for 










Ensuring both security and civil liberties are core functions of a democratic state, but achieving 
the right balance between these is challenging. Public sector executives face a difficult dilemma 
between providing protection and adequate security for the population while maintaining 
legitimacy. Individual rights, such as freedom of expression, religion, mobility, assembly as 
well as privacy are central to any representative democracy. The right to due process is among 
the most important political values in a democratic society, but so is the government’s 
responsibility to protect its citizens.1 Individual rights and freedom may in some instances be 
in conflict with a situational security imperative, especially during times of national threat and 
crisis.2  
Most of the debate over the trade-off between security and liberty and the challenges to 
democracy represented by the more far-reaching counter-terrorism laws has revolved around 
the ‘input’ side of democracy – i. e. legitimacy and citizens’ trust in government. In this article, 
however, we will look at the output side of democracy, in other words civil servants’ 
willingness to trade off individual rights for security. Focusing on public employees’ 
perceptions and priorities is also important for dealing with terrorism.3 
The ‘fear factor’ tends to further centralization and coordination within states, implying 
a ‘contraction’ of political-administrative systems.4 Critical events, such as a terrorist attack, 
tend to strengthen the power of the executive and potentially challenge democratic institutions.5 
Both external and internal events may result in restrictions being imposed on recognized 
liberties in order to achieve more security and they thus alter the balance between the executive 
and the legislature. Such shifts challenge established and valued democratic principles and 
should therefore be thoroughly scrutinized and discussed. 
Liberties tend to be constrained in the process of re-establishing safety after terrorist 
attacks. When perceptions of threat or danger increase, liberties tend to shrink6, and democratic 
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governments have tended to suppress or modify civil liberties in the aftermath of terrorism.7 
The trade-off thesis is contested, however. Security and liberty may be traded off in some, but 
not all domains.8  Privacy and protection from terrorism are not always in conflict, and reducing 
the protection of privacy does not necessarily increase security from terrorism.9 Conversely, 
liberty is not necessarily diminished in all respects when security increases; neither does liberty 
always increase if security measures decrease.10  
Public administration research has been rather absent in the debate concerning the 
question of administrative capacity and legitimacy in turbulent times and unsettled situations, 
i.e. in crises that typically go beyond routine and “business as usual” situations.11 This article 
aims to fill this gap and to that end incorporates crisis management into the public 
administration research agenda, addressing the challenges the strategic level encounters in 
handling the trade-off between security and civil liberties. 
Since 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’, many scholars have argued that the threat 
from terrorism has lowered Western governments’ threshold for introducing strong counter-
terrorism measures and heightened people’s tolerance of such measures.12 The trend has been 
most evident in the US and the UK13, but far-reaching counter-terrorism legislation has also 
been passed in Canada, Australia and France, often strengthening the power of the executive.14 
Several other countries, including Norway, passed new counter-terrorism laws and introduced 
other measures in the wake of 9/11.15 Such regulations normally give the police and intelligence 
services considerable new powers in the areas of surveillance, arrest and detention.16 While an 
awareness of issues concerning personal freedom, human rights and abuse of power related to 
counter-terrorism measures is fundamental to democracy, security and protection are also 
imperative. When the trust in and quality of a political-administrative system is high, it can both 




This article focuses on Norway. Norway is an interesting case because it has had very 
limited experience with terrorism. Until 2011, it had never faced any serious terrorist attack. At 
the same time it is a high trust society, both in terms of inter-personal trust and trust in 
governmental actors and institutions.17 The combination of a historically low threat level, 
limited previous experience, and a high level of trust, may create a favorable environment for 
preventive policies, at least for a period of time.18 A high level of trust relates to what Easton 
labels ‘scoring high on diffuse support’,19 meaning overall trust in the political-administrative 
system, which represent ‘high slack’.20 An environment that tends to favor and support 
preventive policies might mean that the discussion of security versus liberty is less prominent 
and perhaps also less conflict-ridden. The issue is nevertheless important, as both security and 
liberties are crucial values in a democratic society. 
In Norway, the public debate and general attention to the dilemma between security and 
civil rights have until recently been moderate. A survey conducted in 2007 revealed that the 
Norwegian population was rather supportive of stronger counter-terrorism measures.21 Some 
suggest that this might be explained both by the absence of earlier terrorist attacks and by a lack 
of earlier formative experiences of authoritarian or intrusive government.22 On the other hand, 
the reaction from the Norwegian political leadership represented by the prime minister was 
muted after the terrorist attack in July 2011, stressing democracy and multi-culturalism as 
pertinent answers.23  
When studying the trade-off between security and civil liberty one can focus on different 
actors and stakeholders. One approach looks at the attitudes of the population, since they are 
often the first to feel the impact of control measures.24 Another group that is of interest is 
politicians, either politicians in general or executive politicians, i.e those in power, in 
government. In this article, we focus on a third group, namely the attitudes of key civil servants, 
that is those who are responsible for preparing and implementing security measures decided on 
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by politicians. Accordingly, a main issue in this article is what characterizes the attitudes 
towards balancing counter-terrorism measures and civil liberties among administrative 
decision-makers within the central government bureaucracy. Our main questions are: 
• To what extent are civil servants in ministries and central agencies willing to give 
priority to safeguarding societal security over individual liberty? 
• To what extent do such attitudes vary according to structural, cultural and demographic 
features? 
 
In the following, we first outline the Norwegian context, including the development of the 
current organization of societal security. This is followed by presenting our theory and 
empirical expectations. After presenting our data, method and main results, we go on to analyze 
those results and then conclude, including some limitations. 
 
The Norwegian Context 
 
Norway is characterized as a state-friendly society marked by a high level of trust,25 which 
includes a high inter-personal trust and high trust in governmental actors (politicians and 
administrative leaders) and institutions (Christensen and Lægreid 2005). Surveys of public 
support for political institutions very often accord Norway a leading position.26 It has relatively 
strong collectivistic and egalitarian values, is consensus-orientated and has a low level of 
internal conflict.27 High levels of trust combined with tolerance for strong preventive measures 
seem to reflect a general confidence in government and the state and a corresponding trust in 
the ‘virtuousness of the state’ in contrast to the more fundamental skepticism towards central 
government apparent in the US and other Anglophone countries.28  
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The terrorist events of July 22, 2011, altered the picture of Norway as a peaceful and 
sheltered corner of the world.29 Suddenly terror was not a remote threat any longer. A home-
grown individual terrorist with extreme anti-muslim attitudes bombed central governmental 
buildings and attacked a youth camp of the Labour Party, killing 77 people, mostly young party 
members30. The attack had importance both for the legitimacy for the executive political 
leaders, which increased because they stressed that the country’s answer was more democracy, 
standing together and for supporting traditional values, but also furthering multi-culturalism. 
This set the tone for more muted reactions, but also gave more leeway for potential preventive 
measures, i.e. ‘we trust our leaders’ to evaluate those.  
Until 9/11, which also influenced the Norwegian development, counter-terrorism was a 
rather marginal issue within Norwegian societal security policy.31 Despite the lack of major acts 
of terror in Norway until July 2011, the terrorist attacks in Spain and the UK, and certainly 9/11 
and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, were highly relevant in the Norwegian context too.32 The 
Norwegian government has since introduced new counter-terrorism regulations.33 The present 
Norwegian counter-terrorism laws might not be as radical as those in the US or UK, but they 
have certainly tipped the balance between liberty and security in favor of security. The aim of 
extensive parliamentary counter-terrorism legislation was to strengthen the government’s 
capacity to detect and avoid terrorist attacks and as a result democratic rights have been 
constrained.34 A main feature in Norway has been a shift of focus from a retrospective to a 
prospective use of criminal law.35 The public debate over the introduction of the post 9/11 
counter-terrorism measures was, however, limited.  Counter-terrorism acts have gradually 
become more radical and initiatives from the Police Security Service have mainly been 
approved by the Ministry of Justice and the government and passed through parliament with 
few changes and rather weak opposition.36 This indicates that there is a broad support for and 
trust in the ways the government handles these issues.  
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A survey from 2007 showed that three out of four Norwegians would accept more 
surveillance if it made everyday life safer. Norwegian citizens have a rather high level of trust 
in the government’s ability to handle and prevent crises.37  A majority of the population support 
the detention of suspects without trial to prevent terrorism. This means that in Norway, 
progressive legislators might lack the corrective force of skeptical public opinion. Since July 
22, citizens have become less satisfied with governmental policy on security-related issues. 
This goes especially for the specific support for the authorities’ handling of crises, but less so 
for their general support for the government.38 Overall opinions among citizens about the 
balance between civil liberties and societal security did not change significantly after the 
terrorist attack.39  
The more draconian counter-terrorism laws are contested. The main objection is that 
they constrain individual rights and civil liberties. While some see the development as a 
necessary evil to protect citizens’ security, others think that it might weaken democracy.40 A 
first objection is related to the need for more far-reaching counter-terrorism laws. The argument 
is that the measures are disproportionate to the risk of being exposed to a terrorist act again.41 
A second objection is related to the question of whether these means are an effective way to 
fight terrorism. The means-end relationship is contested and the evidence-based knowledge 
about the effects of the measures is ambiguous and uncertain.42 
 
Theoretical perspectives  
How to measure the quality of counter-terrorism policies and institutions is a core question.43 
In this article we address this question by applying a structural, a demographic and a cultural 
perspective based in organization theory44. This means that we try to bring this type of theory, 
often used in the European PA literature, into crisis management studies. 
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According to a structural perspective, political and administrative leaders who have 
relatively clear intentions and basically achieve their aims dominate decision-making processes 
in public organizations. The basic underlying premise is that the formal structure of public 
organizations will channel and influence the models of thought and the actual decision-making 
behavior of civil servants.45 Another major precondition is that leaders score high on rational 
calculation,46 meaning that they must have relatively clear goals, choose structures that 
correspond with these goals and have insight into the potential effects of the structures chosen.  
A main precondition is that certain civil servants in certain positions, related to 
hierarchical level and specific tasks, will have an attention structure and possess knowledge 
that gives them more insight into crisis management and they will therefore assess certain 
situations differently to civil servants with other positions and tasks. Accordingly, we focus on 
the importance of six structural variables for understanding variations in perceptions of security 
among civil servants: policy area, administrative level, policy area,  hierarchical position, type 
of tasks, capacity and management tools.  
Regarding administrative level, we distinguish between ministries and subordinate 
central agencies. The expectation is that the ministries will be less in favor of trading off 
individual rights for security owing to their superior position with a more coherent and holistic 
approach closer to the political executive, while the central agencies are more specialized and 
closer to the specific threats and risks, which will foster more focus on security.  
The relevance of policy area, a reflex of internal specialization in central government,  
is measured by drawing a distinction between ministries and agencies more directly involved 
in societal security and crisis management and those that are not. We expect civil servants in 
agencies and ministries with a specific crisis-management responsibility to assess draconian 
counter-terror measures more positively than those who do not belong to such policy areas.47 
More specifically, we distinguish on the one hand between the Ministry of Defense, the Police 
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Department and Department of Public Security in the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 
the National Security Agency, the National Police Directorate, the Directorate for Civil 
Protection and Emergency Planning and the Directorate for Emergency Communication, and 
on the other hand, all other ministries and central agencies.  
Furthermore, our expectation is hierarchical structural position, that is, seeing crisis 
management from different points of departure and performing tasks that involve a wider 
knowledge base, broader networks and activities, will lead to variations in the assessment of 
central questions of crisis management. Our general assumption is that civil servants in 
leadership positions will generally see the use of crisis management tools more positively than 
employees without such leadership responsibilities. Leaders are primarily expected to attend to 
or to be responsible for preventing and handling crises and they will therefore see them from a 
top hierarchical-coordinative perspective.  
When it comes to capacity our expectation is that civil servants who assess the 
authorities’ ability to reduce risk and prevent big accidents and disasters as high will be more 
willing than others to trade off individual liberties for societal security. In addition, we would 
expect civil servants whose main tasks involve staff functions to have a more positive attitude 
to radical counter-terrorism measures than civil servants with other tasks because their daily 
work brings them more into contact with crisis prevention and handling. This goes especially 
for employees whose main task is Human Resources. The last structural variable used is having 
a diverse set of management tools, in other words, we presuppose that the extensive use of risk 
management tools might indicate a positive attitude toward the use of radical counter-terrorism 
measures.  
Second, we use a demographic perspective and a set of demographic variables as 
explanatory factors for different perceptions of crisis management.48 The focus here is on where 
civil servants come from and the social background they bring with them into the ministries 
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and central agencies regarding experience, norms, values and competence, rather than where 
they are located in the organizational structure or the administrative culture. 
The general reasoning here is that civil servants, through their socioeconomic 
background or their individual careers, have acquired certain norms and values that are relevant 
in their jobs.49 The more specific question will be whether such differences in background 
systematically lead to variations in their perception of crisis management, which is more 
challenging. Our first expectation is that civil servants who are older and have a longer tenure 
will perceive the crisis management questions differently to their younger, less experienced 
colleagues and will be more supportive of strong measures. This will be the case especially if 
they were working in the ministries and central agencies before the bomb explosion in 2011; 
we would then expect them to be more willing to trade off liberty for security than civil servants 
who entered the service after the terrorist attack. 
We also expect gender differences, with men taking a more positive attitude towards the 
authorities’ preventive measures and women caring more about individual rights. In addition, 
we examine whether educational background helps to explain the variation. We would expect 
civil servants with an education in law and social sciences to stress individual rights more than 
other educational groups. 
The third perspective used in the analysis is the cultural-institutional one.50 This 
perspective views the development of a public organization as based on historical traditions, 
path dependency and informal norms and values.51 Actors will think and act according to a 
logic of appropriateness, not one of consequence. What is appropriate for a civil servant to do 
is defined by the institution to which he or she belongs and where he or she will have 
internalized cultural norms through socialization.52  
The first cultural variable used is mutual trust between ministry and central agencies are 
central characteristics and they make it possible to coordinate many activities in ways that make 
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them mutually consistent. A high level of mutual trust tends to enhance appropriate behavior 
and vice versa. In civil service systems with strong vertical sector relationships, such as the 
Norwegian one, civil servants know how to act and this creates and maintains trust relationships 
within the different sectors.53 Therefore, people in ministries and central agencies with a high 
level of mutual trust are expected to be more willing to trade off individual rights for security 
than others. 
The second cultural variable is identity, measured as whether the civil servants have a 
high level of identification with their own organization (ministry/agency). The expectation is 
that scoring high on identity with own governmental organization imply being willing to 
emphasize societal security measures more, because they have internalized  organizational 
values and norms  regarding safety and security which is a core responsibility for public sector 
organizations.  
A third cultural variable is level of conflict in own area of work. Our expectation is that 
civil servants working in a policy area with a high level of conflict may be less likely to trade 
off individual rights for security, because this creates more insecurity and less trust. Fourth, we 
also expect civil servants focusing more on transparency to be more skeptical about accepting 




The empirical data in this article consists of a web survey of civil servants in Norwegian 
ministries and central agencies conducted in 2016, run by the authors and being part of the 
Norwegian Administrative Survey done every 10th year since 1976 by the same research group. 
It is a comprehensive survey covering the civil servants perceptions regarding their work and 
administrative reforms, their participation and contact pattern, as well as structural features, 
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tasks and demographic features. All civil servants with at least one year tenure, from executive 
officers to top civil servants in the ministries, and every third civil servant in the central 
agencies, randomly selected were included. In total, 2322 employees from the ministries and 
1963 from the central agencies answered the survey. The response rate was 60.1 % in the 
ministries and 58.9 % in the agencies, overall a very high response rate. It is a unique survey, 
which is representative for the civil servants in the Norwegian central government.  
The civil servants were asked the following questions: How willing are you to accept 
safeguarding societal security at the expense of individual liberty (for example privacy). We 
asked the respondents to rank their answers from 1 (very willing) to 5 (not at all).  In total, 1630 
employees in the ministries and 1233 in the central agencies answered this question. Thus, 692 
respondents (30 %) in the ministries and 730 respondents in the central agencies (37%) did not 
answer, most probably because they had no opinion on this issue or the question was not 
relevant for them. These respondents are excluded from the analyses in this article leaving us 
with those civil servants who had expressed an opinion on this issue.   The survey was 
conducted six years after the terrorist attack which affected the public debate on this issue for 
at least six years  afterwords. The terrorist attack was the main event that likely shaped the 
views on this issue among the civil servants at this time. 
 
The trade-off between societal security and individual liberties 
Table 1 reveals, first, that there is a rather strong agreement between citizens and civil servants 
about their willingness to trade-off individual liberty for societal security. Overall, more are 
willing than unwilling to do this, but the skepticism is somewhat higher in the population: 28% 
are unwilling or very unwilling to trade off individual liberties for societal security in the 
population, in contrast to 19% in central agencies. Second, there is a high compliance between 
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civil servants in ministries and central agencies on this issue: While 37% are willing, only 20% 
are unwilling to trade-off individual liberty for societal security. This picture echoes the high 
trust context of Norwegian society and the government system. High generalized trust and also 
high trust in government among citizens results in a high level of willingness both within the 
government apparatus and among the citizens to accept that individual rights might be traded 
off against societal security. There is no big gap in these perceptions between the general public 
and central government officials.  
 
TABLE 1 IN ABOUT HERE 
  
Multivariate analysis 
We now turn to the relative explanatory power of the different independent variables. In the 
multivariate analysis, we only included those independent variables that showed statistically 
significant bivariate correlations concerning the trade-off between social security and 
individual rights.  
The main results (Table 2) are, first, that the independent variables can only explain a 
minor part of the total variation in the civil servants’ perceptions. Second, there is no one-factor 
explanation for variations in the trade-off between societal security and individual rights. 
Overall, we find that structural, demographic and cultural features matter.   
 




Third, regarding structural features, the strongest factor is administrative capacity to reduce 
risks, followed by tasks, policy area and position. Civil servants who assess the government’s 
ability to reduce risks and prevent major accidents and catastrophes as good are more willing 
to trade off individual rights for societal security. The same goes for those who work in the 
policy areas connected with societal security and crisis management, whose main tasks are in 
Human Resources and who are in management or executive positions.  
Fourth, regarding demographic features, age and gender matter. Older employees and 
women are more willing to trade off individual rights for societal security than men and younger 
employees. These relationships hold up after controlling for structural and cultural features.  
Fifth, when it comes to cultural features, employees who perceive a high level of mutual 
trust between ministries and central agencies and a low level of conflict in their own field of 
work and who identify strongly with their own ministry or agency are more willing to trade-off 
individual rights for societal security. 
 
Analysis: Structural, cultural and demographic factors matter  
Returning to our expectations regarding the relationship between the different structural, 
demographic and cultural features, we see that 8 out of 15 expectations are supported (Table 
3). Four of the seven structural features seem to make a difference: policy area, position, tasks 
and capacity. Civil servants in the policy area of internal security and crisis management, who 
have Human Resources as a main task, who are in management or executive positions and who 
assess the capacity for reducing risk and preventing crises as good are more willing to trade-off 
individual rights for societal security. There is, however, no significant variation according to 
whether they work in ministries or central agencies, whether they were in the government 




TABLE 3 IN ABOUT HERE 
 
Only one of our expectations regarding the importance of demographic features is supported: 
older people are more in favor of trading-off individual rights for societal security than younger 
people are. There is also an effect of gender but in a different direction to what we expected. 
Women are more willing to accept radical counter-terrorism measures than men. There is no 
effect of tenure or education.  
The three expectations from the cultural perspective are supported: a high level of 
mutual trust between ministries and central agencies, a low level of conflict in own field of 
work and a high level of identity with own organization all seem to strengthen acceptance of 
draconian anti-terrorism measures. There is no effect of transparency and openness. 
Summing up, our expectations regarding structural and cultural features seem to get 
more support than the demographic variables (one out of four). Among civil servants, the 
strongest support for security over liberties is highest in the following groups: 
• Works in the policy area of societal security and crisis management 
• In a management or executive position 
• Works in Human Resources 
• High perceived capacity for reducing risks and preventing crises 
• Older civil servants 
• Women 
• High level of mutual trust between ministries and central agencies 
• Low level of conflict in own work area 




Taken together this yields a pattern that is in line with a transformative approach,54 which states 
that central features of public administration can be better understood by combining different 
theoretical perspectives. The different perspectives are supplementary rather than alternative in 
their explanatory power,55 indicating that there is a need to synthesize theories on understanding 
perceptions and actions in government. Instead of setting structural and cultural features against 
each other as alternatives, as has commonly been done in the Norwegian debate,56 the insight 
from these data is that instead we should look at the interplay between structural and cultural 
features and also take demography into consideration.57  
This means that threat perceptions and willingness to trade-off individual rights for 
security do not exist independently of management or political processes and play out within 
structural, cultural and demographic constraints. Representations of risk and how it is dealt 
with, and the organization’s set of tools to handle threats coexist in specific political and 
organizational contexts. The policies pursued in the crisis aftermath might create opportunities 
for a change of policy in the long run and result in the introduction of preventive measures that 
may be only remotely related to specific experiences, lessons learned or attitudes expressed. On 
the other hand, we might also have to accept that we cannot avert all threats and that security 
and safety cannot always be restored by the use of stronger security measures.  
If we look at the three main groups of independent variables, the structural variables 
mostly show an expected pattern. The results partly allude to hierarchy and partly to special 
competence and tasks. Managers and executives are more willing than others to balance in favor 
of security, which is probably because they feel an extra responsibility for these concerns, but 
also because they have a more overall and holistic perspective and experience, which leads 
them to see these measures as necessary. Another hierarchy-oriented variable, namely 
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administrative level, has no effect, however, which indicates that the division of tasks between 
ministries and agencies regarding these questions is not that clear in reality. 
 Concerning specialized competence, both civil servants working directly in the field of 
societal security and risk management and those working close to such tasks related to Human 
Resources score high on using strong measures, most likely because of their exposure to and 
expertise in this area. Perceived high capacity to reduce risks or prevent crises also belongs to 
this pattern. The reason why those who say that risk management is an important tool do not 
score very high may be that in the Norwegian public sector this is a more generalist tool used 
everywhere. 
 The results for the demographic variables are rather ambiguous. The only expected 
result is that older employees support stronger security measures, which may reflect the fact 
that people tend to worry more as they get older, or possible become more cynical. At the same 
time, tenure does not have a similar effect, which may be because tenure is more related to an 
accumulation of various experiences.58 We expected men to be more supportive of security over 
liberty, but we found the opposite. Perhaps women feel more vulnerable in crises than men?59 
We find no effect of education, which is also rather surprising. A viable explanation for this 
could be that civil servants educated in law and social sciences in modern bureaucracies tend 
to be generalists working in a variety of fields and therefore have not acquired special 
competence or attitudes related to this issue. 
 The cultural variables show the expected pattern. High mutual trust between ministries 
and agencies alludes to what Krasner labels ‘scoring high on cultural width and depth’, which 
are essential parts of institutionalization processes.60 These features are supposedly strong when 
there is a lack of conflict and high level of identity with own orgnaization. So the reasoning 
based on these results is that if integrative features, as March and Olsen label them,61 are strong 
in an institution, its employees will be more convinced that the system can cope with and 
18 
 
withstand more draconian measures (i.e., more security) for some time. This again alludes to 
the concept mentioned earlier, namely diffuse support, coined by Easton,62 meaning a 
generalized trust in the system, or to Cyert and March’s notion of ‘slack’ in an organization.63 
The only cultural variable that does not show any statistical effect is transparency, which may 
reflect the fact that this feature is so well established that it is not strongly related to the trade-
off question. 
Conclusion  
This article has addressed how willing civil servants and citizens are to trade off individual 
liberties for security after a major terrorist attack in a high trust context and how civil servants’ 
perceptions vary according to structural, cultural and demographic features. First, we have 
shown that the overall attitudes to this question among central government officials are rather 
similar to the attitudes of the population. From a democratic point of view and regarding 
governance legitimacy, this is a good sign. It may reflect that Norway is a relatively 
homogeneous and safe society. It also indicates that there is no significant legitimacy problem 
in this policy area. The implication is that the Norwegian authorities will have the support of 
citizens in the event of a new terrorist attack. One reason for this is that diffuse support is high 
and there are extra resources readily available.64 A reasonable supposition following from this 
is that democratic states seem capable of reducing fear of terrorism among their citizens, and 
terrorism might therefore have a relatively weaker impact on that fear.65 This might also mean 
that citizens’ willingness to trade off individual liberties against security in this context will be 
rather high.  
Second, we found that civil servants are more willing than unwilling to trade off 
individual rights for security. This is somewhat surprising given that Norway can be categorized 
as belonging to a reconciliatory model of counter-terrorism, in contrast to the more hardline 
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models focusing on criminal justice and warfare.66 This leads us to believe that stronger 
democracies might be more likely to use reconciliatory measures, even when facing terrorist 
attacks with strong symbolic power. The nature of the terrorist attack and the appropriateness 
and legitimacy of the use of hardline counter-terrorism measures seem to make a difference. In 
any country facing a terrorist attack, the government will probably want to act when the issue 
of security is current, in order to be seen as proactive. By introducing and supporting counter-
terrorism measures, politicians and government officials try to tackle criticism and avoid blame-
games. Worldwide there has been a response to a new managerial and political climate of 
‘security precautions’ in the wake of 9/11 and other international terror attacks.67 In Norway, 
the experiences of Oslo and Utøya and the introduction of stronger counter-terrorism measures 
in their wake add to this.  
Third, we found significant variations in the way civil servants address the trade-off 
between individual rights and security. Security and liberties might be traded off more in some 
domains than in others. Some structural and cultural features as well as demographic factors 
constrain the trade-off among civil servants while others enable and drive the balance in other 
directions. Rather than converging to one common view, we see a lot of complexity and 
divergence among government staff. What tasks, policy area, and positions the civil servant has 
matters, as does perceived crisis management capacity. Civil servants who are most exposed to 
and responsible for crisis management are more willing to trade off individual rights than those 
who are more at arm’s length from this field in their daily work. Such features, in combination 
with a low level of conflict, a high level of mutual trust and strongly identifying with own 
organization tend to make civil servants favor security measures more strongly. In addition, age 
and gender also matter.   
How to balance civil rights and security is a dilemma denoting a tension between 
competing alternatives that pose clear advantages and disadvantages. But such a dilemma might 
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also have paradoxical features seen in a longer time-horizon. A certain chosen balance between 
security and individual freedom might be temporary and tensions might resurface.68 The more 
civil servants stress the advantages of one, the more this might accentuate the opposite. When 
civil servants work to strengthen security this might at the same time accentuate arguments for 
safeguarding civil rights and individual freedoms to secure legitimacy. Thus, the organizational 
tension represented by the dilemma between security and civil liberties might not necessarily 
be seen as contradictory. The overall organizational performance might depend more on 
addressing security and civil rights simultaneously, and in this regard they might actually 
reinforce each other.  
A few limitations regarding this analysis should be mentioned. First, related to the 
previous argument, we have no process data that make it possible to trace the dynamics between 
security and civil rights over time. Second, the trade-off between individual rights and security 
is mainly seen from the central government point of view. Here, the strategic and policy-making 
level is in the foreground. We do not know how the picture would look from the perspective of 
civil servants who handle crises on the ground or at the operational level, or how officials 
working at the local, regional and supra-national levels would assess this trade-off.  Third, our 
focus on Norway constrains the possibilities for generalizing outside the high trust, 
representative democracies in Scandinavia. Fourth, the survey taps perceptions about the trade-
off on a general level but does not consider more objective or specific counter-terrorism 
measures or specific types of individual rights and liberties. Fifth, our data can only reveal a 
cross-sectional snapshot of the situation in 2016 and hence tell us little about different starting 
points and change over time. Sixth, all our variables are from the same survey, indicating that 
a common source bias might be a concern.69 This last problem is, however, reduced by using 
structural and demographic variables as independent variables. Finally, a multi-level analysis 
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might give a more nuanced picture, allowing us to examine the importance of individual-level 
explanations in relation to organizational level variables.70  
In spite of these limitations, we argue that the data employed in this article provide a 
rich empirical backdrop against which to assess our theoretical arguments. They allow us to 
measure variations in civil servants’ perceptions regarding the trade-off between societal 
security and individual liberties across different positions and policy areas and across the 
ministry/central agency divide, taking into account both cultural and demographic features. 
This gives us new insights for considering the important and delicate balance between societal 
security and individual liberties.  
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Table 1. How willing are you to accept safeguarding societal security at the expense of 
individual liberty (for example privacy). Civil servants in ministries and central agencies and 
citizens. Percentages. 
 
 Ministries and central 
agencies 2016 
Citizens 2013–2014 
Very willing 8.0 7.7 
Willing 29.3 25.7 
Somewhat willing 43.2 38.4 
Unwilling 16.9 21.3 
Very unwilling 2.6 6.7 
N 2863 2337 
The data for citizens are based on an identical question asked of a representative sample of Norwegian 
citizens over the age of 18 in November 2013-January 2014, conducted  




Table 2. Trade-off between societal security and civil rights by structural, demographic 
and cultural features. Linear Regression. Standardized Beta coefficients.  
 Beta 
Structural features: 
- Policy area (emergency/societal security) 
- Position  
- Tasks (Human Resources) 













- Mutual trust 














Table 3. Trading off individual rights for societal security. Support for hypotheses 
  





-Administrative level: Central agencies 
-Policy area: Societal security and crisis management  
-Position: Managers and executives  
-Tasks: Employees with Human Resource Management as main task  
-Management tools: Risk management is an important tool 









-Age: Older employees 
-Gender: Men 
-Tenure: Long 







-Mutual trust: High level 
-Identity:  Strong identity related to own ministry/central agency 
-Conflict: Low level  
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